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We consider schemes for secret key distribution which use as a resource correlations that violate
Bell inequalities. We provide the first security proof for such schemes, according to the strongest
notion of security, the so called universally-composable security. Our security proof does not rely on
the validity of quantum mechanics, it solely relies on the impossibility of arbitrarily-fast signaling
between separate physical systems. This allows for secret communication in situations where the
participants distrust their quantum devices.
PACS numbers:
In an experimental set-up where a Bell inequality [1]
is violated, one has the certainty that the outcomes of
some local measurements are not determined beforehand.
This limits the amount of correlations between such out-
comes and other systems not involved in the experiment.
It also limits the knowledge about these outcomes that
a distant party can have. This fundamental piece of our
understanding of physical reality can be exploited for im-
plementing information-theoretic tasks. For instance, in
this letter we show that a secret key generated from the
outcomes of Bell-violating measurements is secure. This
reasoning is independent of quantum mechanics, the only
key assumption is the impossibility of arbitrarily-fast sig-
naling between separate systems.
The first scheme for generating secret key from Bell-
violating correlations was presented in [2], and was fol-
lowed by others [3–5]. All these schemes where presented
with partial security proofs. The results presented in this
letter, complemented with the ones in [6], provide a gen-
eral security proof without assumptions (apart from no
signaling) for all these schemes. We use the strongest se-
curity criterion, the so-called universally-composable se-
curity [7], which warrants that key distribution is secure
in any context. Our methods are very general, and can be
adapted to other Bell inequality-based key-distribution
schemes.
No signaling Consider two parties, Alice and Bob, each
having a physical system which can be measured with
different observables. Let a(b) be the outcome when Al-
ice(Bob)’s system is measured with one of the observables
parametrized by x(y), with joint conditional probability
distribution denoted by Pa,b|x,y. We say that Pa,b|x,y is
a nonsignaling distribution if the marginals depend only
on their corresponding observables, that is Pa|x,y = Pa|x
and Pb|x,y = Pb|y for all a, b, x, y [8]. It is clear that if one
of these conditions is not satisfied, then arbitrarily-fast
signaling is possible.
Nonlocality The distributions that can be written as
Pa,b|x,y =
∑
λPλ Pa|x,λ Pb|y,λ (1)
are called local, and satisfy all Bell inequalities [8]. In
the binary case (a, b, x, y ∈ {0, 1}) all Bell inequalities
are equivalent to the CHSH inequality [9]. For what fol-
lows, it is convenient to write the CHSH inequality as
〈CHSH|Pa,b|x,y〉 ≥
√
2, where the vector
|CHSH〉 = 1
4
√
2
1 5 1 5
5 1 5 1
1 5 5 1
5 1 1 5
(2)
contains the coefficients of the inequality, and the vector
|Pa,b|x,y〉 =
P0,0|0,0 P0,1|0,0 P0,0|0,1 P0,1|0,1
P1,0|0,0 P1,1|0,0 P1,0|0,1 P1,1|0,1
P0,0|1,0 P0,1|1,0 P0,0|1,1 P0,1|1,1
P1,0|1,0 P1,1|1,0 P1,0|1,1 P1,1|1,1
(3)
contains the probabilities for all experimental settings.
[We arrange the components of these vectors in a ta-
ble for the sake of clarity.] Notice that in this form,
the lower the quantity 〈CHSH|Pa,b|x,y〉 the larger the
violation. The distribution attaining maximal viola-
tion (〈CHSH|Pa,b|x,y〉 = 1/
√
2) is the so-called PR-box
[10], which can be considered the maximally nonlo-
cal (nonsignaling) distribution. The correlations gener-
ated by measuring quantum systems are constrained by
Cirel’son’s bound 〈CHSH|Pa,b|x,y〉 ≥ 2−1/23 − 1 ≈ 1.121
[11].
Privacy amplification (PA) is the procedure by which
a partially secret Nr-bit string a (the raw key) is trans-
formed into a highly-secret Ns-bit string k (the secret
key) [12]. Usually, the secret key is shorter than the raw
key (Ns < Nr), which is the price for the gain in privacy.
The function implementing this transformation h(a) = k
is called hash function. It is usually the case that the
hash function has to be generated randomly after the
raw key a has been obtained, but in our scheme, h is
fixed from the beginning and known to everybody, in-
cluding the eavesdropper (Eve). An ideal secret key is a
uniformly-distributed random variable k which is uncor-
related with the rest of the universe (Eve). The informa-
tion held by Eve is encoded in the state of a physical sys-
tem, which can be measured with one of many different
2observables, parametrized by z. If Pe|z is the distribution
for the outcomes when this system is measured with the
observable z, then the distribution of an ideal secret key
is P ideal
k,e|z = 2
−NsPe|z . Usually, the real secret key gener-
ated by PA is not guaranteed to be an ideal secret key,
Pk,e|z 6= 2−NsPe|z .
In general, PA constitutes a sub-routine within crypto-
graphic protocols, which use secret key as an ingredient
(an example being the encryption of messages). It is
desirable that the result obtained when any of these pro-
tocols is fed with the real secret key, is the same as if fed
with an ideal secret key, with arbitrarily high probabil-
ity. If this is the case, then we say that PA is universally
composable, because it is secure in any context. Clearly,
this happens if the real and ideal secret keys are indistin-
guishable.
The most general strategy for distinguishing the bipar-
tite states Pk,e|z (the real key) and 2−NsPe|z (the ideal
key) consists of performing joint measurements on the
key and Eve’s system. The no signaling formalism alone
does not say anything about joint measurements. How-
ever, the key is a classical system which can be observed
without disturbing the global state. Therefore, the most
general strategy is to read k and chose an observable z
depending on its value. It is well known that the proba-
bility of guessing correctly with the optimal strategy is
pcorrect =
1
2
+
1
4
∑
k
max
z
∑
e
∣∣Pk,e|z − 2−NsPe|z∣∣ . (4)
Notice that the maximization on z depends on k. When
(4) is close to 1/2, the optimal strategy for distinguishing
the real from the ideal key is as good as a random guess—
this is the security condition that we consider.
In key distribution from Bell-violating correlations, Al-
ice has N systems, Bob has N systems and, without
loss of generality, Eve has one “big” system, jointly dis-
tributed according to an arbitrary (unknown) Pa,b,e|x,y,z.
[Bold symbols correspond to bit-string variables.] It is
usually assumed that this is a (2N+1)-partite nonsignal-
ing distribution [6] (i.e. the marginals only depend on
their corresponding observables), however, we are able
to proceed with a weaker assumption. If the secret key is
a function of Alice’s string k = h(a), then Bob’s N sys-
tems can be considered as a single “big” system, that is,
no-signaling within Bob’s systems is not required in our
proof. We refer to this assumption as “(N+2)-partite no
signaling”. According to [14], the even weaker assump-
tion of 3-partite no signaling (where Alice’s N systems
are also considered as single one) is insufficient to war-
rant security. Of these N pairs of systems, Nr (Nr < N)
are used for generating the raw key, and the rest are used
to estimate how much nonlocality is shared by Alice and
Bob [6]. In the large-N limit, Nr is equal to N up to
terms sublinear in N—this is denoted by Nr ≈ N .
The following result establishes the security of Al-
ice’s key k = h(a) when a is generated by measuring
Nr of Alice’s systems with the observable x = 0. Of
course, it is necessary that the correlations shared by Al-
ice and Bob Pa,b|x,y have a sufficiently small value of
〈CHSH|⊗Nr |Pa,b|x,y〉, or in other words, are sufficiently
nonlocal. However, the goal of key distribution is that
both, Alice and Bob, hold the secret key k. Later we
address this problem.
Main result For almost all functions h : {0, 1}Nr →
{0, 1}Ns and any (Nr + 2)-partite nonsignaling distribu-
tion Pa,b,e|x,y,z, the random variable k = h(a) satisfies∑
k
max
z
∑
e
∣∣Pk,e|x=0,z − 2−NsPe|z∣∣
≤
√
2
Ns+
√
Nr 〈CHSH|⊗Nr |Pa,b|x,y〉 , (5)
where 0 is the zero vector.
Here and in the rest of the letter we say that “almost all
functions have a particular property” if when randomly
picking a function h with uniform distribution over all
functions h : {0, 1}Nr → {0, 1}Ns then the probability
that h does not have that particular property is lower
than 2 exp(5Nr − 2
√
Nr/4). The above result is also true
for any x 6= 0, but for simplicity we only consider the
case x = 0, which is sufficient for key distribution.
When the given correlations Pa,b|x,y are generated by
measuring quantum systems Cirel’son’s bound implies
〈CHSH|⊗Nr |Pa,b|x,y〉 > 1, which prevents the right-hand
side of (5) to be small. Hence, this simple scheme does
not work with quantum correlations. This problem is
solved by the BHK protocol, which yields large secure
secret keys. The BHK protocol is analyzed below. Now,
we proceed to prove the main result, and start by stating
two lemmas which are proven in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 For any (Nr + 1)-partite nonsignaling dis-
tribution Pa,b|x,y we have Pa|x=0 = 〈Γa|Pa,b|x,y〉, where
|Γa〉 = |γa1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |γaNr 〉 and
|γ0〉 = 1
8
1 −3 1 5
5 1 −3 1
1 −3 5 1
5 1 1 −3
, |γ1〉 = 1
8
1 5 1 −3
−3 1 5 1
1 5 −3 1
−3 1 1 5
.
Lemma 2 For any given function h : {0, 1}Nr →
{0, 1}Ns and any k ∈ {0, 1}Ns, define Ak = h−1(k) and
|ΓAk〉 =
∑
a∈Ak |Γa〉. Almost all functions h satisfy
∣∣2Ns |ΓAk〉 − 4−Nr |1s〉∣∣  √2Ns+
√
Nr |CHSH〉⊗Nr , (6)
for all k, where the symbol |·| denotes entry-wise absolute
value, the symbol denotes entry-wise less or equal than,
and |1s〉 ∈ R16Nr has all entries equal to one.
3Proof of the main result Let h be any of the functions
which satisfies (6), and for each k, let |ΓAk〉 be the vector
defined in Lemma 2. Using Pk|x=0 = 〈ΓAk |Pa,b|x,y〉, the
convexity of the absolute-value function, the inequality
(6), and the fact that the marginal for a,b cannot depend
on z, we have∑
k
max
z
∑
e
Pe|z
∣∣∣Pk|x=0,e,z − 2−Ns∣∣∣
≤
∑
k
max
z
∑
e
Pe|z
∣∣∣〈ΓAk | − 2−Ns−2Nr〈1s|∣∣∣|Pa,b|x,y,e,z〉
=
√
2
Ns+
√
Nr〈CHSH|⊗Nr |Pa,b|x,y〉 , (7)
which is precisely (5). 
Error correction and public communication It is usu-
ally the case that the given distribution Pa,b|x,y does not
provide perfect correlations between a and b. Hence, if a
is the raw key, Bob has to correct the errors in b before
applying the hash function h. This can be done by Alice
publishing some information about a, and Bob using it
for correcting his errors. This is a standard procedure
in quantum key distribution, which is detailed in [6] or
[16]. Other procedures within the key distribution pro-
tocol may also require public communication. Let the
Nc-bit string c be all the information about a that Alice
has published during the protocol. Because c is a func-
tion of a, we can still use the main result (5) in this new
setting if we let both, k and c, to be the outcomes of the
function h : {0, 1}Nr → {0, 1}Nc × {0, 1}Ns. However, k
and c play different roles: k is the secret key and c is part
of the information owned by Eve. Hence, the extension
of the security condition (5) to the present setting is∑
k,c
max
z
∑
e
∣∣Pk,c,e|z − 2−NsPc,e|z∣∣
≤ 2
√
2
Nc+Ns+
√
Nr 〈CHSH|⊗Nr |Pa,b|x,y〉 , (8)
where here and in the rest, the conditioning on x = 0 is
implicit. This inequality is obtained by taking (5) and
using the triangular inequality with the third distribution
2−Nc−NsPe|z . The secret key is secure if the right-hand
side of (8) can be made arbitrarily small (as Nr grows).
This happens when the length of the final key is
Ns ≈ log2
[
〈CHSH|⊗Nr |Pa,b|x,y〉−2
]
−Nc , (9)
up to sub-linear terms.
Parameter estimation In the unconditional-security
scenario, the honest parties are given N pairs of systems
in a completely unknown global distribution. To perform
a key distribution protocol, and in particular to set the
numbers Ns and Nc, they need to bound some quantities,
like for instance 〈CHSH|⊗N |Pa,b|x,y〉. In order to do so,
they invest some of the given pairs to obtain information
about the distribution Pa,b|x,y of the Nr remaining pairs.
More precisely, they compute the bounds for Ns, Nc for
another distribution P ′
a,b,e|x,y,z, which is warranted to
be close to the real (unknown) one (
∑
a,b,e |P ′a,b,e|x,y,z−
Pa,b,e|x,y,z| ≤ ǫ for all x,y). This is explained with full
detail in [6]. It is shown in [15] that∑
k,c
max
z
∑
e
∣∣Pk,c,e|z − 2−NsPe,c|z∣∣ (10)
≤ 2
√
2
Ns+Nc+
√
Nr 〈CHSH|⊗Nr |P ′
a,b|x,y〉+ 2ǫ ,
which provides the security bound for the real (unknown)
distribution in terms of properties of any ǫ-close primed
distribution.
The BHK protocol introduced in [2] and analyzed in
[5, 6] gives a rate of one secret bit per singlet (|00〉+|11〉).
It is remarkable that this protocol, where the adversary
is only constrained by no signaling, gives the same rate
as if the adversary is constrained by no signaling plus
quantum mechanics. The essential novelty of the BHK
protocol is to measure each system with m ≥ 2 observ-
ables, x ∈ {1, . . .m}. In this case, instead of the CHSH,
we use the Braunstein-Caves Bell inequality [17], which
can be expressed as 〈BC|Pa,b|x,y〉 ≥
√
2, with
|BC〉 = 1
2
√
2m
1 α 1 α
α 1 α 1
1 α 1 α
α 1 α 1
. . .
. . .
. . . 1 α
α 1
α 1 1 α
1 α α 1
, (11)
where α = 2m+1, and the empty entries represent zeroes.
Notice that for m = 2 this is equivalent to the CHSH
inequality (2). Following the same methods as above,
one can prove inequalities analogous to (5), (8), (10), and
obtain a key rate as in (9) but with the Braunstein-Caves
Bell inequality
Ns ≈ log2
[
〈BC|⊗Nr |Pa,b|x,y〉−2
]
−Nc . (12)
This rate formula can be improved by modifying |BC〉 in
the following way: take the expression (11) and substi-
tute α by
√
1 + 4m2. The security of this rate will be
proven somewhere else.
If Alice and Bob share singlets or something close to
it, in the estimation process they measure them with all
the observables corresponding to points in the equator of
the block sphere (see [2, 5, 6] for details), the generated
4correlations have 〈BC|⊗Nr |Pa,b|x,y〉 ≈ 1/
√
2, for large m.
The raw keys a,b are generated by measuring all systems
with the same observable x = 0, then a = b and Nc ≈ 0.
Formula (12) tells that the secret key rate is one secret
bit per singlet: Ns ≈ Nr. This rate cannot be improved
because it is also the optimal rate achievable against a
much weaker (quantum) adversary.
Conclusions We show, for the first time, that key
distribution from Bell-violating correlations is secure ac-
cording to the strongest notion of security, the so called
universally-composable security. This provides the pos-
sibility of implementing secure cryptographic protocols
with untrusted quantum devices [3, 18]. In this model,
Alice and Bob have to trust some of their apparatuses
(classical computers and the random number generator),
but can distrust the devices for preparing and measur-
ing the quantum systems sent through the channel. The
efficiency rate is slightly lower than the one obtained in
standard quantum key distribution, where trusting the
quantum devices is necessary.
Interestingly, in our scheme, Bell-inequality violation
plays the same role as the min entropy [16] does in stan-
dard quantum key distribution. Specifically, equations
(5) and (9) have a quantum counterpart, obtained with
the exchange
log2
[
〈CHSH|⊗N |Pa,b|x,y〉−2
]
↔ Hmin(a|e) . (13)
A novelty of our scheme is that randomness extraction,
or equivalently PA, can be performed with a constant
hash function. This contrasts with previous methods for
extracting randomness (two-universal hashing [12], ex-
tractors, etc.), which need random functions. However,
we still lack an explicit construction for one of such hash
functions.
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APPENDIX
Here we show the two lemmas stated above.
Proof of Lemma 1. Here we use the same tools as in the
proof of Lemma 16 from [6]. By definition we can write
Pa|x=0 = 〈Γ′a|Pa,b|x,y〉, where |Γ′a〉 = |γ′a1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |γ′aNr 〉
and
|γ′0〉 =


1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 , |γ′1〉 =


0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 .
The fact that Bob (when considered as a single system)
cannot signal to Alice can be expressed as Pa|x,y =
Pa|x,y′ for any y,y′. This implies that Pa|x=0 =
〈Γ′′a|Pa,b|x,y〉 where |Γ′′a〉 = |γ′′a1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |γ′′aNr 〉 and
|γ′′0 〉 =
1
4


2 2 2 2
0 0 0 0
−1 −1 1 1
1 1 −1 −1

 ,
|γ′′1 〉 =
1
4


0 0 0 0
2 2 2 2
1 1 −1 −1
−1 −1 1 1

 .
The fact that each of the Nr Alice’s systems cannot sig-
nal to the rest, together with Bob’s systems, implies the
statement of the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 2 Within this proof, the entries of any
vector |Φ〉 ∈ R16Nr are labeled as Φ(a,b,x,y). Also, for
any pair of bit-strings x,y: (i) the string x · y is the bit-
wise product, (ii) the string x⊕y is the bit-wise xor, and
(iii) the integer ‖x‖ is the number of ones in x. Using this
notation we can write the entries of the vector |CHSH〉⊗Nr
5as CHSH⊗Nr(a,b,x,y) = 2−5Nr/25‖a⊕b⊕x·y‖. Next we
prove inequality (6) for a given k and a given entry
(a0,b0,x0,y0). Let Va = 1 if the string a belongs to
Ak, and Va = 0 otherwise. If we pick a random function
h with uniform distribution over the set of all functions,
then the random variables Va are independent and dis-
tributed according to Prob{Va = 1} = 2−Ns , for all a.
Let µa = Γa(a0,b0,x0,y0), M = ‖a0⊕b0⊕x0 ·y0‖, and
note that |µa| ≤ 5M8−Nr for all a. Following Bernstein’s
contruction, for any J and β ≥ 0 we have
Prob
{∑
a
µaVa ≥ J
}
≤ Prob
{
e−βJ+β
P
a
µaVa ≥ 1
}
≤ e−βJ
〈
eβ
P
a
µaVa
〉
≤ e−βJ
∏
a
[
2−Nseβµa +
(
1− 2−Ns)]
≤ e−βJ
∏
a
[
1 + 2−Ns
(
βµa + β
2µ2a
)]
(14)
≤ exp[− βJ2−Ns∑a(βµa + β2µ2a)]
where in (14) we need |β 5M8−Nr | ≤ 1. In this step we
have used the expansion ex ≤ 1 + x+ x2, which holds if
x ≤ 1. With a little work one obtains ∑a µa = 4−Nr
and
∑
a µ
2
a ≤ 2−5Nr52M . Substituting this two ex-
pressions, J = 2−Ns−2Nr + 2(
√
Nr−Nr−Ns)/2 4−Nr 5M and
β = 2(
√
Nr+Nr+Ns)/2 4Nr 5−M we get
Prob
{∑
aµaVa ≥ 2−Ns−2Nr + 2(
√
Nr−Nr−Ns)/2 4−Nr 5M
}
≤ e−2
√
Nr/4 .
Note that the chosen value for β satisfies the required
constraint. The expression obtained when replacing “≥”
with “≤” above, can be derived in a similar way. Then
∣∣2Ns ΓAk(a0,b0,x0,y0)− 4−Nr∣∣
>
√
2
Ns+
√
Nr
CHSH⊗Nr(a0,b0,x0,y0) (15)
holds with probability 2 e−2
√
Nr/4. However, we want this
to not hold for all k and all entries (a,b,x,y). The
number of different values of k is 2Ns , and the number of
different entries is 16Nr, then the probability for (6) being
not true is upper-bounded by 2 exp(5Nr − 2
√
Nr/4). 
